Recent Developments: Williams v. Wilzack: Maryland Statute Allowing Involuntarily Committed Mentally Ill Patients to Be Forcibly Medicated Violated Procedural Due Process by Schmitt, Kathleen Dunivin
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 21
Number 1 Fall, 1990 Article 15
1990
Recent Developments: Williams v. Wilzack:
Maryland Statute Allowing Involuntarily
Committed Mentally Ill Patients to Be Forcibly
Medicated Violated Procedural Due Process
Kathleen Dunivin Schmitt
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schmitt, Kathleen Dunivin (1990) "Recent Developments: Williams v. Wilzack: Maryland Statute Allowing Involuntarily Committed
Mentally Ill Patients to Be Forcibly Medicated Violated Procedural Due Process," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 21 : No. 1 ,
Article 15.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol21/iss1/15
Id. at 2648. Thus, the statements were 
not testimonial. Id. at 2649. 
However, the Court concluded that 
when Muniz was asked whether he 
knew the date of his sixth birthday, he 
was confronted with the cruel trilemma 
in a coercive environment created by 
the custodial interrogation. Id. Since his 
answer was testimonial, it should have 
been suppressed. 
The Court then addressed the State's 
argument that the initial questioning 
period did not constitute custodial inter-
rogation or its "functional equivalent." 
Id. at 2650. In Rbode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court 
defined the "functional equivalent" of 
interrogation as "any words or actions 
on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the suspect." 
Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650. Finding that 
custodial interrogation did exist, it none-
theless held Muniz's answers regarding 
name, address, weight, eye color, date of 
birth, and current age admissible as fall-
ing within the newly adopted "routine 
booking" exception, established in 
United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180 
(8th Cir. 1989), which exempts ques-
tions to secure the information neces-
sary to complete booking or pretrial 
services. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650. 
Muniz made additional statements 
while performing three sobriety tests 
and while deciding not to take a breath-
alyzer test. Yet, the Court noted, the 
statements were made in response to 
carefully scripted instructions not in-
tended to elicit any verbal responses. Id. 
at 2651. Therefore, the officer's words 
or actions did not constitute interroga-
tion and even the questions requesting a 
response were merely "attendant to" 
legitimate police procedure. Id. Hence, 
Muniz's statements were made voluntar-
ilyand thus were admissible. Id. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing a 
concurring opinion, agreed that the 
statements made when the accused was 
asked the date of his sixth birthday, 
should not have been suppressed. This 
result was premised on the grounds that 
if the police may require Muniz to use 
his body in order to demonstrate the 
level of his physical coordination, they 
should be able to require him to speak 
or write in order to determine mental 
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coordination.Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, C. 
J., concurring). Rehnquist disagreed 
with the recognition of a routine book-
ing exception to Miranda. He felt the 
"booking" questions were not testi-
monial so there was no need to apply the 
privilege. Id. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C. )., 
concurring). 
Justice Marshall, the sole dissenter, 
agreed with the majority that Muniz's 
response to the question regarding the 
date of his sixth birthday should have 
been suppressed as the question consti-
tuted custodial interrogation prior to 
receipt of Miranda warnings. Id.(Mar-
shall,}., dissenting). He disagreed, how-
ever, with the recognition of the routine 
booking exception and believed the 
Court had misapplied the Innis test 
when considering custodial interroga-
tion.Id. at 2655-56 (Marshall,}., dissent-
ing). Marshall believed the routine 
booking exception would necessitate 
difficult, time consuming litigation over 
whether particular questions were rou-
tine, necessary for recordkeeping and 
designed to elicit incriminating testim-
ony. Id. at 2655 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). 
It is apparent that the Supreme Court 
will continue their conservative outlook 
with regard to drunk driving prosecu-
tions. As illustrated by this case, if evi-
dence is not obtained by way of custo-
dial interrogation or falls within the 
routine booking exception to Miranda, 
the courts will allow evidence obtained 
by way of videotape. 
- Freddie] Traub 
Wi/Iiams v. Wi/zack: MARYLAND 
STATUTE ALLOWING 
INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED 
ME NT ALLY ILL PATIENTS TO 
BE FORCIBLY MEDICATED 
VIOLATED PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS 
In Williams v. Wilzack, 319 Md. 485, 
573 A.2d 809 (1990), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that § 10-708 
of the Maryland Health-General Article, 
which established procedures for medi-
cating mentally ill patients against their 
will, lacked the requisite procedural 
due process protections guaranteed by 
the state and federal constitutions. Al-
though the decision did not render the 
statute unconstitutional, it potentially 
did weaken the ability of psychiatrists to 
forcibly medicate possibly dangerous 
patients, even if such medication is 
approved by a clinical review panel. 
Laquinn Williams was committed to a 
state mental hospital after a judicial 
determination that he was not crimi-
nally responsible. See Md. Health-Gen. 
Code Ann. § 12-108 (1990). After Wil-
liams was diagnosed a paranoid schiz-
ophrenic, his doctor prescribed treat-
ment with an antipsychotic drug. Wil-
liams objected to taking the medication 
for fear it would disrupt his thought 
process, interfere with the exercise of 
his Sunni Muslim religion, and reduce 
his ability to assist his attorney in a sub-
sequent release hearing. Id. at 490,573 
A.2d at 811. A clinical review panel was 
convened to review William's decision. 
Williams and his lawyer were allowed to 
be present for part of the hearing so that 
Williams could explain his reasons for 
objecting. The panel, however, unani-
mously determined that the medication 
was the least intrusive way to effectively 
treat Williams and ordered that he be 
forcibly medicated. Id. at 490,573 A.2d 
at 811. Williams was medicated against 
his will for approximately two weeks 
until he stated his plans to obtain an 
injunction to prohibit the medication. 
The medication was, therefore, tempo-
rarily discontinued and another review 
panel was convened. This second review 
panel also unanimously recommended 
that Williams be forcibly medicated. Id. 
at 491,573 A.2d at 812. 
Williams filed an action in the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County alleging 
that the procedures under § 10-708 vio-
lated his state and federal constitutional 
rights to privacy, due process, freedom 
of speech, thought, and religion. Id. The 
trial court determined that § 10-708 was 
both constitutional on its face and as 
applied. As such, the court granted the 
State's motion for summary judgment 
and denied William's motion for partial 
summary judgment. Williams appealed, 
and the court of appeals granted certio-
rari before the court of special appeals 
decided the case. Id. at 492, 573 A.2d at 
812. 
The court of appeals initially ex-
plained that without § 10-708, the com-
mon law rule as set forth in Sard v. 
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 
( 1977) would apply. The Sard rule 
required that a physician obtain a pa-
tient's consent before he treated a pa-
tient in a non-emergency situation. Wil-
Iiams, 319 Md. at 494,573 A.2d at 814 
(citingSard, 281 Md. at 439,379 A.2d at 
1014). 
Next, the court looked at each appli-
cable health statute in detail, noting 
their procedural and substantive due 
process requirements. Williams argued 
that § 10-708 did not provide for proper 
notice, the right to attend the meeting, 
the right to a written decision, or the 
right to an appeal. Id. at 492,573 A.2d at 
813. 
After addressing the applicable health 
statutes, the court focused upon the 
Supreme Court cases of Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 US. 307 (1982) and Wash-
ington v. Hatper, 11 0 S. Ct. 1028 ( 1990). 
The court used these cases to support 
the rationale that due process consider-
ations could be satisfied if professional 
judgment was used to override the pa-
tient's objections. Williams, 319 Md. at 
495, 573 A.2d at 813. 
Although Youngberg did not deal 
with forcible administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs, the case did address what 
rights a person involuntarily committed 
to a state institution possessed under 
the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. The Court in Youngberg 
concluded that such an individual could 
be restrained to the extent deemed 
necesary by the medical profession. Wil-
liams, 310 Md. at 497, 573 A.2d at 814 
(citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 324). In 
reaching this decision, the Supreme 
Court stated "it was necessary to bal-
ance the liberty of the individual and the 
demands of an organized society." Id. at 
495, 573 A.2d at 814, (citing Young-
berg, 457 US. at 320). Specifically, the 
court reasoned that although the com-
mitted individual possessed certain 
rights, the state also had legitimate rea-
sons for restraining a committed indi-
vidual's liberty. Id. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court 
stated that deference should be given to 
the decisions made by the medical staff 
of an institution in that judges and juries 
were not better qualified than medical 
professionals in determining which pro-
cedures best protect an individual's lib-
erty interests. Id. at 496,573 A.2d 814 
(citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 322-23). 
Unlike Youngberg, the recently de-
cided case of Harper deals specifically 
with whether a state had the right to 
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs 
to an involuntarily committed prisoner. 
In answering in the affirmative, the 
Court held that the state had a rational 
basis for administering the drugs to the 
inmates, regardless of their displeasure. 
Williams, 319 Md. at 499, 573 A.2d at 
816. 
It found that, substantively, the state's 
administrative policy was a "rational 
means of furthering the state's legiti-
mate objectives of administering drugs 
for treatment purposes under the direc-
tion of a licensed psychiatrist." Id. at 
502, 573 A.2d at 817 (citing Harper, 
110 S. Ct. at 1042). Procedurally, the 
Court stated that nothing in the Consti-
tution prohibited the state from permit-
ting medical personnel to make that 
decision "under fair procedural mecha-
nisms." Id. at 503, 573 A.2d at 818 (cit-
ing Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042). 
Although the court of appeals noted 
that Williams was not a prisoner in a 
penal institution, as was the patient in 
Harper, it stated that Harper set forth 
procedural due process guidelines for 
determining whether Williams' consti-
tutional rights were violated. Id., at 508, 
573 A.2d at 820. The court concluded 
that because § 10-708 did not provide 
Williams with notice of the final review 
proceeding, or the ability to present 
evidence, or the ability to cross examine 
witnesses, it did not afford the requisite 
procedural due process protections to 
which Williams was entitled. Id. at 509-
10,573 A.2d at 821. 
The court ruled, therefore, that it was 
error to enter summary judgment against 
Williams, and it was error to deny Wil-
liams' motion for partial summary judg-
ment. Consequently, the court held that 
the common law rule, as set forth in 
Sard v. Hardy, requiring a patient's con-
sent before the administration of such 
drugs, applied in William's case. Id. at 
510,573 A.2d at 821 (citingSard, 281 
Md. at 439,379 A.2d at 1014). 
The court of appeals concluded that 
additional procedural due process pro-
tections were owed to Williams even 
though the Supreme Court, in Harper, 
specifically did not require such protec-
tions. In so holding, it is obvious that the 
Maryland court wished to give invol-
untarily committed individuals addi-
tional guarantees of due process protec-
tion above and beyond what the Supreme 
Court required. 
- Kathleen Dunivin Scbmitt 
Eanes v. State: RESTRICTIONS ON 
THE VOLUME LEVEL OF 
PROTECTED SPEECH HELD 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
In Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 569 
A.2d 604 (1990), the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that a statute limiting 
the volume level of protected speech 
does not violate the first amendment to 
the United States Constitution 
While speaking against abortion in 
front of the Hagerstown Reproductive 
Clinic ("Clinic"), Jerry Wayne Eanes 
("Eanes") made no threat of violence, 
no effort to physically restrain those 
entering the Clinic, and made no attempt 
to block access to the Clinic. Eanes, 318 
Md. at 441, 569 A.2d at 606. Addition-
ally, Eanes did not use obsenity, profan-
ity or attempt to incite violence. Eanes 
spoke without artificial amplification, 
yet, was alleged to have spoken so loudly 
that he was heard above the noise 
generated by traffic. Throughout the 
day, local residents and people employed 
in the vicinity made several complaints 
to the local police regarding the loud-
ness of Eanes' speech. Id. 
After the police department had re-
ceived numerous complaints concern-
ing the volume level of the demonstra-
tor, the police warned Eanes to lower 
his voice. Eanes ignored the warning 
and was arrested for disturbing the 
peace in violation of Md. Ann. Code art. 
27, § 121 (1989). Section 121 makes it 
unlawful for anyone to "wilfully disturb 
any neighborhood in [any Maryland] 
city, town or county by loud and un-
seemly noises." Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 
121 (1989). Eanes was found guilty in 
the District Court of Maryland for Wash-
ington County. Eanes, 318 Md. at 442, 
569 A.2d at 607. 
On appeal, Eanes, citing Diebl v. State, 
294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert. 
denied, 460 US. 1098 (1983), con-
tended that only speech not protected 
by the first amendment was subject to a 
statutory prohibition against "loud and 
unseemly noises." Eanes, 318 Md. at 
443, 569 A.2d at 607. The court, dis-
agreed with Eanes' interpretation, and 
explained that the prohibition against 
"loud and unseemly noises" in Diehl 
sought to regulate objectionable con-
tent of speech. Whereas in Eanes, the 
court pointed out, it was the volume 
level which was objectionable, not the 
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